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A TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY
OF CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW
Stephanie Ben-Ishai∗

PART I: INTRODUCTION
The most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning
corporate governance, Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of)
1
v. Wise, has been both criticized and applauded on the basis that
it represents a significant departure from the traditional
understanding of the legal role of directors of Canadian public
companies.2 Peoples centered around Wise Stores and the Wise
brothers. Wise Stores was founded in 1930 by Alex Wise, who
opened a small retail-clothing store in Montreal, Quebec. Alex
Wise had three sons, who each joined his business when they
came of age. In 1986, Wise Stores, by now a chain of department
stores, went public and was listed on the Montreal Stock
Exchange. In 1992 Wise Stores acquired the troubled Peoples
chain from M&S, which was owned by the British parent

∗

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Canada.
1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 64 [Peoples].
2
For an example of the criticism, refer to Allan Hutchinson, “A Not-So-Wise
Decision” [forthcoming in 2005, manuscript on hand with author]. For an
example of the applause, refer to Bob Milnes, “Case Comment” (2005) 20.3
B.F.L.R. 148. For a more general evaluation of the decision see: Catherine
Francis, “Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of
Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care” (2005), 41 C.B.L.J.
175; Wayne D. Gray, “A Solicitor’s Perspective on Peoples v. Wise” (2005), 41
C.B.L.J. 184; Warren Grover, “The Tangled Web of the Wise Case Warren
Grover” (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 200; Ian B. Lee, “Peoples Department Stores v. Wise
and the “Best Interests of the Corporation” (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 212; Stéphane
Rousseau, “Director’s Duty of Care after Peoples: Would It Be Wise to Start
Worrying about Liability?” (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 223; and Jacob Ziegel, “The
Peoples Judgment and the Supreme Court’s Role in Private Law Cases” (2005),
41 C.B.L.J. 236.
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company, Marks and Spencer. Peoples became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Wise Stores. The three Wise brothers were the sole
directors of Peoples. The Toronto Dominion Bank (“TD”) and
M&S financed the purchase and took security interests in the
assets of Peoples.
In an effort to rationalize operations, the Wise brothers began
consolidating the overlapping corporate functions of Wise Stores
and Peoples. Numerous problems surfaced and ultimately the
brothers decided upon an inventory procurement policy such that
Peoples would make all purchases from North American suppliers
and Wise Stores would, in turn, make all purchases from overseas
suppliers.
The difficulty with this arrangement was that
approximately 82 per cent of the total inventory of Wise Stores
and Peoples was purchased from North American suppliers, which
inevitably meant that Peoples would be extending significant trade
credit to Wise Stores.
Despite efforts to rationalize operations, the fragile financial
position of Peoples and Wise Stores continued. Following the
presentation of financial statements showing poor results for
Peoples’ third fiscal quarter, M&S initiated bankruptcy
proceedings against both Wise Stores and Peoples. In response, a
notice of an intention to make a proposal under the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act3 was filed on behalf of Peoples the same day.
However, the following month Peoples consented to the
bankruptcy petition filed by M&S and both Wise Stores and
Peoples were declared bankrupt on January 13, 1995.
Peoples’ unsecured suppliers, whose claims were largely purchased
4
by vulture funds, represented the majority of the creditors whose

3

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
Milnes, supra note 2. Vulture funds are asset-based funds, which invest in
distressed debt or other securities issued by companies in default or in
bankruptcy. Vulture funds are relatively new players on the Canadian
bankruptcy and reorganization landscape. See Justin R. Fogarty, “Vulture
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claims were not paid in full in the Peoples bankruptcy. The entire
balance of the purchase price owed to M&S, the full outstanding
debt owed to TD and almost all of the landords’ lease claims were
satisfied from the assets of Wise Stores and Peoples. The vulture
funds that purchased the unsecured suppliers’ claims argued that
the Wise brothers as directors of Peoples breached their statutory
fiduciary duty and duty of care in adopting the inventory
procurement policy to the detriment of the unsecured suppliers.
The Supreme Court upheld the Quebec Court of Appeal’s finding
that the Wise brothers had not breached their fiduciary duty or
duty of care in adopting the inventory procurement policy. In
reaching this decision, the Supreme Court held that “the interests
of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the
creditors or any other stakeholders.”5
Widespread current thinking among the Canadian legal
community supports the view that Peoples is an unjustified
departure from Canadian corporate law’s principal-agent,
shareholder primacy understanding of the board of directors’ role
in public corporations. It is on the basis of this shareholderprimacy understanding of the existing legal role of directors of
public corporations that over the last decade Canadian academics,
lawyers, and the judiciary have put forward diverging normative
visions of what the legal role of directors should be. At one end of
the spectrum is the most common account provided by law and
economics scholars and others who adopt a principal-agent model
of the relationship between shareholders and the board, where
directors’ sole duty is to maximize the wealth of the shareholders,
6
who are the owners of the corporation. According to this account,
other corporate stakeholders should be left to protect their own

Culture: The Changing Dynamics of the CCAA & BIA” (2001) 18 Nat’l Insolv.
Rev. 61.
5
Peoples, supra note 1 at para. 43.
6
Jeffrey MacIntosh, “The Role of Institutional Investors and Retail Investors in
Canadian Capital Markets” (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 371. See also Jeffrey
MacIntosh, “Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law” (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 425.
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interests by bargaining for the best returns that they can. At the
other end of the spectrum, less popular rival progressive accounts
suggest that directors should owe duties to all of the corporation’s
7
stakeholders. These accounts have generally accepted that the
principle-agent, shareholder primacy model is currently operating
in Canadian corporate law, but call for legal reforms so that
corporations can be made to run with due regard for corporate
stakeholders such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers,
8
and local communities. While widely rejected in academic and
legal circles, such rival accounts have, however, found support in
Canadian popular culture, as is evidenced by the success of Joel
Bakan’s book9 and the documentary The Corporation.10
This article suggests that the response to Peoples and the
Canadian corporate governance debate, as currently engaged, is
operating on the false underlying assumption that the principleagent, shareholder primacy model accurately describes Canadian
corporate law’s treatment of public corporations.11 This article
applies the Team Production Theory developed by American
12
corporate law scholars, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to argue

7

Allan Hutchinson, “Beyond Greed: Profits, Priorities and People”
[forthcoming in 2005, manuscript on hand with author]; Harry J. Glasbeek,
“The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement – The Latest in Maginot Lines
to Save Capitalism” (1988) 11 Dal. L.J. 363; Stanley M. Beck, “The Corporation
and Canadian Society” (Paper presented to the Conference on Canadian
Corporate Governance, C.D. Howe Institute, 1994) [unpublished].
8
Glasbeek, supra note 7 at 46; Hutchinson, supra note 2.
9
Joel Bakan, The Corporation : The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2004).
10
Mark Achbar, Jennifer Abbott & Joel Bakan, The Corporation (Vancouver: Big
Picture Media Corporation, 2004).
11
In fact, empirical studies reveal that the shareholder primacy norm has little
or no actual impact on corporate decision-making. See D. Gordon Smith, “The
Shareholder Primacy Norm” (1998) 23 J. Corp. L. 277.
12
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law” (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 [TPT]; Blair and Stout’s theory has had
significant impact in the American context. See for example, Symposium,
“Team Production in Business Organizations” (1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 743
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that Canadian corporate law’s understanding of public
corporations that are not controlled by a single shareholder or
group of shareholders reflects a director primacy norm rather than
a shareholder primacy norm. Canadian corporate law provides
that directors of such public corporations with widely-held share
ownership and voting rights are free from direct control of any
corporate stakeholders.13
Rent allocation among Canadian

(containing 8 different articles on Team Production Theory); Erica A.
Chiappinelli, “The Moral Basis of State Corporate Law Disclosure” (2000) 49
Cath. U.L. Rev. 697; and Mae Kuykendall, “Assessment and Evolution:
Retheorizing the Evolving Rules of Director Liability” (1999) 8 J.L. & Pol. 1.
Given the significant scholarly attention Team Production Theory has received
in the United States, it is surprising that it has not attracted greater attention in
Canada. One notable exception is the debate between Robert Yalden and Jeffrey
MacIntosh in the 2002 Queen’s Business Law Symposium. This symposium
did, however, pre-date Peoples and the authors were more concerned with
questions of “what should be” than questions of “what is” and their focus was
on questions surrounding the interplay between corporate and securities law in
Canada. See Robert Yalden, “Competing Theories of the Firm and Their Role in
Canadian Business Law” in The Corporation in the 21st Century: Ninth
Queen’s Annual Business Law Symposium (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) & Jeffrey
MacIntosh, “The End of Corporate Existence: Should Boards Act as Mediating
Hierarchs? A Comment on Yalden” in The Corporation in the 21st Century:
Ninth Queen’s Annual Business Law Symposium (Toronto: Carswell, 2003).
13
This is in contrast to corporations controlled by a single shareholder or group
of shareholders, where a small number of investors select and exercise tight
control over the board and at the same time are often involved in managing the
corporation as officers or directors. The corporate law applicable to this type of
corporation may more appropriately be explained by a principle-agent,
shareholder primacy model, than a mediating hierarch model. It is notable that
a majority of Canadian public corporations have been described as under legal or
de facto control of a single or small group of shareholders. Recent Canadian
scholarship has focused on this type of corporation. See for example, Ronald J.
Daniels & Paul Halpern, “Too Close for Comfort, The Role of Closely Held
Public Corporations in the Canadian Economy and the Implications of Public
Policy” (1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 11; Randal K. Morck, “On the Economics of
Concentrated Ownership” (1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 63 at 69; Stephanie Ben-Ishai
“Family Capitalism and Minority Shareholder Recourse in Canada” in Thémis,
eds. Governance of Public Institutions, Professions, Corporations, Tribunals
and Courts: Ethics, Responsibility and Independence (Montreal: Les Éditions
Thémis, 2005) [forthcoming in 2005, manuscript on hand with the author]; and
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corporate stakeholders depends on extra-legal advantages. A
potential departing point for Canadian corporate law, the
oppression remedy, continues to develop to deal with such extralegal advantages rooted primarily in unequal power relations
among corporate stakeholders. However, in its current application
and predicted future application, the oppression remedy does not
provide any given stakeholder group with an ability to dominate
the boards of public corporations and obviate the director primacy
norm.
Part II briefly describes Team Production Theory. Part III reviews
Canadian corporate law as it applies to public corporations to
assess its consistency with the three concepts that have been
identified as central to Team Production Theory:
1. Corporate personality and the derivative action;
2. The statutory fiduciary duty and duty of care; and
3. The limits on shareholder voting.
Concluding in Part III that the director primacy norm is at work in
the parts of Canadian corporate law that are most comparable to
American corporate law, Part IV argues that the judicial treatment
of the oppression remedy is also consistent with a Team
Production Theory of Canadian corporate law. Part V concludes
by suggesting that because the director primacy norm accurately
describes Canadian corporate law, further consideration needs to
be given to corporate law’s relative relevance in dictating how
Canadian corporations currently operate.
For example, do
directors of Canadian corporations really think of themselves as

Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri, “Dual Class Share Ownership in
Canadian Family-Run Corporations: Evidence of Corporate and Securities Law
Failures” (2004) [unpublished, manuscript on hand with the author]. However,
it still remains important to consider what Canadian corporate law has to say
about public corporations that do not fit this model. These are the public
corporations that are referred to in this article.
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“mediating hierarchs” and corporations as teams?
More
importantly, can directors of Canadian corporations play a
mediating hierarch role given the current composition of corporate
boards? The responses to these questions will help inform further
inquiry into whether the director primacy norm is the ideal norm
for Canadian corporate law.

PART II: TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY
Since Berle and Means suggested that the hallmark of the public
corporation is the separation of ownership and control,14 numerous
other institutional arrangements have developed to perform a
15
16
similar function. These include income trusts and partnerships.
Accordingly, it is the board-based governance structure provided
for in American (and Canadian) corporate law that differentiates
17
On this basis,
public corporations from other business forms.
Blair and Stout have developed a descriptive and normative theory
that challenges the dominant account that public corporations

14

Aldolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (New York: MacMillan, 1932).
15
For more on governance of income trusts see Michael J. Johnson, “Survival of
the Fittest: The Corporate Governance of Income Trusts” in Corporate
Governance and Securities Regulation in the 21st Century (Markham:
Butterworths, 2004).
16
See for example, the Ontario Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16,
s. 13. Section 13 states that, (1) A limited partner is not liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to exercising rights and powers as a limited partner,
the limited partner takes part in the control of the business. (2) For the purposes
of subsection (1), a limited partner shall not be presumed to be taking part in the
control of the business by reason only that the limited partner exercises rights
and powers in addition to the rights and powers conferred upon the limited
partner by this Act. For more on limited liability partnerships, see J. Anthony
VanDuzer, The Law of Partnerships and Corporations, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2003) c. 2.
17
Franklin A. Gevurtz, “The European Origins and the Spread of the Corporate
Board of Directors” (2004) 33 Stetson L. Rev. 925. Gevurtz demonstrates that
around the world the key similarity among corporate governance regimes is that
corporations are managed by, or under the direction of a board of directors.
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belong to shareholders and that directors are shareholders’ agents.
Unlike others who have critiqued the shareholder primacy,
principal-agent understanding of corporate law, Blair and Stout
18
conceive of public corporations as a nexus of contracts. That is,
like those who support the shareholder primacy norm, they argue
that corporations consist of bargains made between various
corporate stakeholders, even though not all such bargains are
necessarily spelled out in complete contracts.
Blair and Stout’s theory, referred to as a Team Production Theory,
suggests that directors of public corporations, as prescribed by
American corporate law, are “mediating hierarchs,” who are
19
accountable to no particular corporate stakeholder. The current
state of the law of public corporations with respect to these
mediating hierarchs in the United States is supported by the team
production concept from economic literature.20
Public
corporations are comprised of team members, such as
shareholders, creditors, workers, managers, and communities that

18

TPT, supra note 12 at 287. For a discussion of other conceptions of
corporations, for instance as an economic institution for social service, see E.M.
Dodd, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev.
1145 at 1148. ; see also, Ruth O. Kuras, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Canada – U.S. Comparative Analysis” (2002) 28 Man. L.J. 303 at 304-05.
19
TPT, ibid. at 282.
20
TPT, ibid. at 272. Team production refers to the division of labor used when
complex forms of production cannot be accomplished efficiently (or at all) by
individuals or families. Firms coordinate team production to (a) reduce
transaction costs, and (b) exploit economies of scale or scope. This theory can
be traced in large part to Ronald Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Firm the Market
and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Also see for
example, Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 and Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,”(1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305. A complete
discussion of the economic literature that the TPT depends on is beyond the
scope of this article. The key insight is that the economic justification for the
corporation is that a corporation will form when it is more efficient for people
to work together within a corporation as compared with simply relying upon
individually negotiated contracts.
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form a team (the corporation) because the members recognize that
each will obtain more from a collective enterprise than on their
21
own. On this basis, all of the team members make investments
that are specific to the team. Team members expect to share in
the corporation’s production rents and surpluses, but are unable to
contract completely for that result, due to reasons of cost,
incentives, and uncertainty as to the separate value of their
contributions following team production.22
Blair and Stout review the various possibilities, other than the use
of a mediating hierarch, for allocation of rents and surpluses exante and ex-post among team members and conclude that they
23
For example, if an individual
produce sub-optimal outcomes.
team member was to be trusted with making decisions on
allocation of rents and surpluses ex-post, each decision they made
would be treated as suspicious. Accordingly, adopting Rajan and
Zingales’ idea of vesting allocational authority in an independent
third party, Blair and Stout suggest that the team delegates to the
board of directors the ultimate authority over running the
corporation and also the distribution among team members of
production rents and surpluses.24 The result is that the costs of
obtaining team specific investments are lowered and employing
this mediating hierarch model of governance maximizes social
wealth. Because of the existence of a mediating hierarch, public
corporations can make credible commitments that they will
refrain from opportunistic behaviour directed at members of the
team. Blair and Stout recognize that this is only a second-best
solution to the team production problem, because the independent
board has no direct stake in the success of the corporation.
However, the mediating hierarch solution is superior to
alternative rent and surplus allocation mechanisms they canvas.

21

TPT, ibid. at 277.
Ibid.
23
TPT, ibid. at 269-71.
24
TPT, ibid. at 272- 76.
22
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Blair and Stout claim that the current state of American corporate
law reflects Team Production Theory’s understanding of the role
of the board. The procedural hurdles and substantive limitations
on the use of the derivative action to enforce directors’ duties as
well as the limited ability of shareholding voting rights to impact
on director preferences give directors broad discretion to manage
the corporation without pure devotion to any particular team
member’s interests.25 In reviewing Blair and Stout’s description of
American corporate law, David Millon has suggested that a more
accurate statement is that,
though corporate law pays lip service to shareholder
primacy, it is actually ineffective when it comes to
rendering management accountable to shareholders …
this doctrinal inefficacy … reflects a commitment to
director discretion, which in this roundabout manner
constitutes the board as independent … mediators.26
This reflection is equally applicable in the Canadian context.

25

TPT, ibid. at 287-315.
David Millon, “New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the
Team Production Model of Corporate Law” (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1001 at 1010.
In addition to Millon a number of other commentators have critiqued the Team
Production Model of corporate law. Like Millon, other commentators have
focused primarily on the Blair and Stout’s position that the Team Production
Model of corporate law is the ideal model for all team members. In particular,
the tenuous position of employees is often pointed to. See for example: Kent
Greenfield, “ The Place of Workers in Corporate Law” (1998) 39 B.C. L. Rev 283;
Lawrence Mitchell, “Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies:
The Missing Link In Corporate Governance” (2005) 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1313;
and Kelly Testy, “What is the “New” Social Responsibility?: Linking
Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements” (2002) 76 Tul.
L. Rev. 1227. Also see infra, note 78 for an example of the other forms of
critique that the Team Production Model of corporate law has been subject to.
For example, Blair and Stout have been criticized for focusing on shareholder
voting rights because they overlook the market for corporate control.
26
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PART III: TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY AND
CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW
The federal Canadian Business Corporations Act27 provides an
example of the type of legal rules that public corporations must
adhere to in Canada.28 This Part reviews the extent to which the
judicial application of three central features of Canadian corporate
law found in the CBCA fit with the role ascribed to directors by
Team Production Theory and depart from the shareholder
primacy, principal-agent understanding of Canadian corporate law
that retains its hegemony in Canadian corporate governance
debates.
Inherent to the concept of agency is that the principal enjoys
control or power over the actions of the agent.29 The role of
directors as set out in Canadian corporate law departs from this
understanding. The primary legal role of directors is to “manage,
or supervise the management of, the business and the affairs of the
corporation.”30
Canadian corporate law does not grant
shareholders any power to initiate action or to control the board.
A review of the derivative action, the statutory duties of boards,
and shareholder voting, reveal that directors are not constituted as
shareholders’ agents by Canadian corporate law. Rather, these
three central aspects of Canadian corporate law allow boards to
pursue the mediating hierarch model envisioned by Team
Production Theory.

27

R.S.C. 1985, c.C-44 [CBCA].
For a review of the differences in the provincial corporate statutes, see Ronald
J. Daniels, “Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate
Market” (1991) 30 McGill L.J. 130.
29
VanDuzer, supra note 16, c. 5.
30
CBCA, supra note 27, s. 102(1).
28
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CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND THE DERIVATIVE ACTION
The corporation’s status as a legal person, separate from its
shareholders, has been described as a striking aspect of corporate
law supporting the mediating hierarch model.31 Derived from the
legal fiction of corporate personality is the concept in Canadian
corporate law that can be traced back to Foss v. Harbottle,32 that
only a corporation can sue for injuries to the corporation,
regardless of any injury to corporate stakeholders. Following Foss
v. Harbottle, corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, could
not sue for an injury to the corporation at common law.33 Foss v.
Harbottle was based on the position that if a corporation is a
separate legal person, separate from its members, and the
corporation was wronged, the corporation itself should sue.34 The
rule in Foss v. Harbottle is particularly problematic with respect
to fiduciary duties.
Directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation. According to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, any action
for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought by the corporation.
However, in public corporations, the corporation acts through the
board, causing a conflict where the board is asked to bring a claim
in the corporation’s name against themselves. It is this problem
that is the source of the derivative action in Canadian corporate
law, which permits certain corporate stakeholders under limited
circumstances to step into the shoes of the corporate entity and
sue in its name and on its behalf.

31

TPT, supra note 12 at 290-315.
(1893), 2 Hare 461; 67 E.R. (V.C.). For a comprehensive treatment of the
history of the oppression remedy see: Jeffrey MacIntosh, “Minority Shareholder
Rights in Canada and England: 1860-1987” (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L.J. 561; and
Deborah A. DeMott, “Oppressed but not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment
of Canadian Remedies for Minority Shareholders and other Corporate
Constituents” (1993) 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 192 [DeMott (1993)].
33
DeMott (1993), ibid. at 192.
34
Jason W. Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private
Law Model Corporation” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 173 at 187.
32

2006]

A TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY

13

The CBCA provides that, in order for leave to be granted for a
derivative action, the complainant must show that not less than
fourteen days notice has been given to the directors of the
corporation of the intention to apply to the court if the directors
do not bring or defend the action, unless otherwise ordered by the
court; the complainant is acting in good faith; and that it appears
to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiaries that the
action be brought, prosecuted, defended, or discontinued.35 To
bring a derivative action under the CBCA, the applicant must be a
“complainant.” A “complainant” includes: (a) a registered holder
or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial
owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates; (b) a
director or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation
or any of its affiliates; (c) the Director; or (d) any other person
who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an
application under this Part. 36
For the most part, the procedural aspects of the derivative action
found in Canadian corporate law mirror the American
requirements. These procedural aspects of the derivative action
have been used by Blair and Stout to support the claim that the
director primacy norm exists in American corporate law on three
grounds: (a) the procedural aspects of the derivative action limit its
use; (b) if a derivative action is successful any damages go to the
corporation; and (c) under certain circumstances, stakeholders
other than shareholders are granted standing to sue derivatively.
All three propositions are supported by Canadian corporate law.
A review of Canadian case law from November 1, 1999 to
November 1, 2004, reveals that only three derivative actions were
reported.37 A shareholder initiated each of these actions, and only

35

CBCA, supra note 27, s. 239(2).
CBCA, ibid., ss. 238, 241.
37
A Quicklaw search for “derivative /2 action” and “duty” in the CJ database
revealed 83 cases. Out of these cases only the highest court decision for each
case was considered and only the main action was considered. The small
36
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one was successful. None of the actions were in the context of a
public corporation. This review of the case law confirms Blair and
Stout’s observation in the Canadian context that the derivative
action has been utilized effectively in limited situations.
As Iaccobucci and Davis have noted, in the Canadian context, the
real danger is not a multiplicity of derivative actions, but a
complete absence of suits.38 Just as in the American context, this
result can be explained in part in the Canadian context by the
procedural requirement for bringing a derivative action. Blair and
Stout’s observation regarding the recipient of damages in a
successful derivative action is also accurate in the Canadian
39
The fact that the corporation is the recipient of any
context.

number of reported decisions may also be explained in part by the fact that
cases are settled out of court. However, currently there is no published
empirical evidence to suggest that there are a significant number of such cases.
In McAteer v. Devoncroft Developments Ltd., [2001] A.J. No. 1481 (QL),
although there were other actions, the derivative action on behalf of Devoncroft
was based on allegations that Billes and McAteer, as directors and officers of
DDL: breached their contractual, legal and fiduciary duties to the corporation
to act honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of Devoncroft; failed to
comply with the provisions of the unanimous shareholder agreement; and failed
to manage the affairs of the corporation prudently and thereby protect its
interests. The derivative action failed as Justice Rooke held that the decisions
made by the directors of the corporation were properly considered. In Discovery
Enterprises Inc. v. Ebco Industries Ltd., [2002] B.C.J. No. 1957 (QL), Discovery
Enterprises as a shareholder of Ebco Industries Ltd. initiated a derivative action
based on misuse of corporate funds. The derivative action was dismissed. In
Jordan Inc. v. Jordan Engineering Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 3260 (QL), one of the
shareholders and principals of Jordan Inc. brought a derivative action on the
basis of wrongful appropriation by the other principal and shareholder through
Jordan Engineering Inc., which was a breach of her fiduciary duty to the
corporation. The action was successful as Justice Kruzick held that Murre took
advantage of a business opportunity that was not in the best interest of Jordan
Inc.
38
Edward M. Iaccobucci & Kevin E. Davis, “Reconciling Derivative Claims and
the Oppression Remedy” (2000) 12 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 87.
39
William Kaplan & Bruce Elwood, “The Derivative Action: A Shareholder's
‘Bleak House’?” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 443 at 455.

2006]

A TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY

15

damages awarded ensures that any benefits from such an action
have the potential to accrue to all of the corporation’s
stakeholders. Shareholders can only benefit directly when the
board determines that a dividend should be made to shareholders.
Another significant feature that supports the notion that the
derivative action exists for the benefit of the entire corporation is
that the CBCA expressly provides that evidence of shareholder
approval, or the possibility of future shareholder approval, is not
40
determinative of whether a derivative action may proceed. The
procedural hurdles to suing derivatively, the limited weight of
shareholder approval, and the fact that damages are awarded to the
corporation can be justified by the mediating hierarch model
because these factors insulate directors from shareholder (and
other corporate stakeholder) challenge and control.
While the derivative action has been utilized only by shareholders
in Canada, and only in rare cases where they have been able to
overcome the collective action and procedural hurdles, there is a
broader scope for the range of complainants that can bring a
derivative action.41 Out of this range of complainants, however,
only creditors have successfully sought standing to sue
derivatively. In Dylex Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Anderson,42 the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice held that the trustee in bankruptcy as
representative of creditors of Dylex was an appropriate
complainant for a derivative action. Four months after the
completion of an agreement between Dylex and the Hareof Wolf
Group Inc., which provided for the latter to acquire all of the
shares of Dylex, Dylex was put into bankruptcy. The trustee
claimed that the agreement breached the directors’ duty of care to
Dylex creditors and fiduciary duty to Dylex.
The limited use of the derivative action is consistent with Team
Production Theory, which seeks to limit rent seeking by corporate

40

CBCA, supra note 27, s. 242(1).
VanDuzer, supra note 16, c. 9.
42
(2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 659 (Ont. Sup. Ct. of Justice) [Dylex].
41
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stakeholders that wider availability of the action would provide.
However, corporate stakeholders need to be granted the ability to
sue directors derivatively in order for the existence of the
derivative action to continue to have any role in ensuring that
team members can trust the board. The explanation for why
shareholders have been able to use the remedy, albeit on rare
occasions, may be that in those instances they have been able
convince the court that they have interests that are in harmony
with a number of other stakeholders. However, where the
corporation approaches insolvency, this might not be the case. In
such situations, shareholders may prefer high-risk approaches,
with low downside risk to them, but at the expense of other
corporate stakeholders, such as creditors and employees.
Accordingly, the most appropriate method to ensure that boards
continue to exercise their mediating hierarch role for the best
interests of the corporation as a whole is to grant creditors
standing to sue derivatively, in such instances. On this basis,
Dylex is consistent with the pattern in Canadian corporate law
that supports granting standing to sue derivatively only in limited
circumstances to protect the interests of the corporation as an
entity, not the interests of any particular group of corporate
stakeholders.

STATUTORY DUTIES
Moving from the procedure for bringing a derivative action to the
substance of directors’ duties, upon which corporate stakeholders
may base a derivative action to sue in the corporation’s name if
breached, Blair and Stout claim that it becomes clear that such
duties serve the corporation rather than any particular corporate
stakeholder. In the Canadian context, the judicial application of
both the statutory fiduciary duty and the statutory duty of care
support Blair and Stout’s claim. That is, both duties will subject
directors to liability only in situations where the conduct harms
the corporation as a whole, not just the corporation’s shareholders.
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FIDUCIARY DUTY
The CBCA statutory duty referred to by Canadian commentators
as the “fiduciary duty” and referred to by American commentators
as the “duty of loyalty,” requires directors to “act honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”43
Canadian commentators have described the Canadian fiduciary
duty in broad terms:
The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and
officers to act honestly and in good faith vis-à-vis the
corporation. They must respect the trust and confidence
that have been reposed in them to manage the assets of
the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the
objects of the corporation. They must avoid conflicts of
interest with the corporation. They must avoid abusing
their position to gain personal benefit. They must
maintain the confidentiality of information they acquire
by virtue of their position. Directors and officers must
serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and loyally.44
The application of this broad duty, however, has generally been
restricted to a narrow range of situations where a director has
made some profit or received some advantage at the expense of the
45
Such situations may arise where a director
corporation.
competes with the corporation, is involved in a transaction with
the corporation in the director’s personal capacity, or where she
takes advantage of opportunities personally that she had a duty to
obtain for the corporation. Some early case law and at least one

43

CBCA, supra note 27, s. 122(1)(a).
Kevin P. McGuinness, The Law and Practice of Canadian Business
Corporations (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) at 715, as cited by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Peoples at para. 35.
45
VanDuzer, supra note 16, c. 8.
44
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commentator has suggested that the fiduciary duty should extend
to situations where directors have made profits as a result of their
46
However, in
position but not at the corporation’s expense.
Peoples the Supreme Court noted that the Wise brothers did not
stand to realize a direct gain at the expense of the corporation in
adopting the inventory procurement policy and held that, “it is
not required that directors and officers in all cases avoid personal
gain as a direct or indirect result of their honest and good faith
47
The Court
supervision or management of the corporation.”
pointed to director’s compensation and possibility of the dual
position as shareholder and director as examples of situations
where directors’ interests will “innocently and genuinely coincide
with those of the corporation.”48
The two situations where the Canadian fiduciary duty has
received the most judicial attention are in the takeover context
and the bankruptcy and reorganization context. These situations
are not outliers; rather they represent circumstances where the
tension between various stakeholders’ individual interests and the
interests of the corporation as a whole are the most visible.
With respect to the takeover context, in response to an offer to
purchase a controlling interest in a corporation at a premium
price, directors of the corporation may take actions49 to defeat the
offer, which normally includes the replacement of directors.
Takeovers generally benefit both shareholders who sell and those
who retain their shares. Those who sell, enjoy a premium. Those

46

Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592; J. Brock, “The
Propriety of Profitmaking: Fiduciary Duty and Unjust Enrichment” (2000) 58
U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 185.
47
Peoples, supra note 1 at para. 39.
48
Peoples, ibid. at para. 39.
49
For example, a poison pill may be put into place. See Jeffrey MacIntosh, “The
Poison Pill: A Noxious Nostrum for Canadian Shareholders” (1989) 15 Can. Bus.
L.J. 276; see also Peter Dey & Robert Yalden, “Keeping the Playing Field Level:
Poison Pills and Directors' Fiduciary Duties in Canadian Take-over Law” (1990)
17 Can. Bus. L.J. 252.
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who retain their shares enjoy the improvements that the bidder
plans to make.
However, takeovers may harm employees,
suppliers, the environment, local communities, and others who
have made corporation specific investments. For example, the
bidder may downsize, move plants, and replace employees.
Accordingly, if directors take actions to defeat a takeover they will
generally be at the expense of shareholders, and may be to the
benefit of other corporate stakeholders. The fact that Canadian
courts have generally not intervened when directors have taken
such defensive measures, and considered such actions to be a
breach of fiduciary duty, runs counter to the shareholder primacy
norm and supports the director primacy norm.
In Teck Corp. v. Millar,50 Justice Berger held that directors must be
able to act in the best interests of the corporation in responding to
a takeover bid and that this extended beyond shareholders’
interests:
A classical theory that once was unchallengeable must
yield to the facts of modern life. In fact, of course, it has.
If today the directors of a company were to consider the
interests of its employees no one would argue that in
doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests
of the company itself. Similarly, if the directors were to
consider the consequences to the community of any
policy that the company intended to pursue, and were
deflected in their commitment to that policy as a result,
it could not be said that they had not considered bona
fide the interests of the shareholders.
I appreciate that it would be a breach of their duty for
directors to disregard entirely the interests of a
company's shareholders in order to confer a benefit on
its employees: Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] Ch. 927.
But if they observe a decent respect for other interests

50

(1972), 33 D.R.R. (3d) 288 (B.C.S.C.) [Teck Corp.]

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 01

lying beyond those of the company's shareholders in the
strict sense, that will not, in my view, leave directors
open to the charge that they have failed in their
51
fiduciary duty to the company.
In fairness to proponents of the conventional principal agent
interpretation of Canadian corporate law, it is important to note
that the facts in Teck did not involve a conflict between the
interests of shareholders and another group of stakeholders.
Rather, what was at issue in Teck, was the competing interests of
two parties attempting to acquire control of Afton Mines Ltd. and
Afton’s board’s conduct in relation to the losing party.52
Accordingly, Justice Berger’s definition of the best interests of the
corporation was obiter in Teck.53 Further, prior to Peoples, Justice
Berger’s conception of the best interests of the corporation had not
54
been endorsed in any subsequent decisions. Equally notable, is
that the Parke decision, referred to in Teck, concerned a set of
facts where employees’ interests were in direct competition with
shareholders’ interests.55 However, prior to Peoples, Parke had
only been followed in one subsequent Canadian decision and the
case involved a co-operative, not a corporation.56
Prior to Peoples there was a measure of ambiguity on the state of
Canadian corporate law on the statutory fiduciary duty. However,
the current state of Canadian corporate law on the statutory
fiduciary duty is squarely consistent with Team Production
57
Theory. In Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the
reasoning developed earlier in the takeover context to the
bankruptcy and reorganization context, holding that, “in

51

Teck Corp., ibid. at 319, cited with approval in Peoples, supra note 1 at para.
42.
52
See Lee, supra note 2, at 213-214.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid at 215-216.
56
Ibid.
57
Peoples, supra note 1.
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determining whether they are acting with a view to the best
interests of a corporation it may be legitimate, given all the
circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to
consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees,
suppliers,
creditors,
consumers,
governments
and
the
environment.”58
The Supreme Court noted that, “creditors'
interests increase in relevancy as a corporation's finances
deteriorate … .”59 However, the Court also recognized that there
are other stakeholders that must be taken into account in an
insolvency situation and held that “the Canadian legal landscape
with respect to stakeholders is unique. Creditors are only one set
60
of stakeholders ... .” On this basis the Court concluded that
because the adoption of the inventory procurement policy did not
harm the corporation as a whole, defined more broadly than
certain creditors or other stakeholders, the Wise brothers had not
breached their fiduciary duty.
Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Peoples, both
the Quebec Superior Court and the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice indicated that the law in Canada appeared to be moving
toward imposing a fiduciary duty to creditors on directors of a
corporation.61 In the Quebec Superior Court of Justice decision,
Justice Greenberg, held that since only creditors have a meaningful
stake in the assets of an insolvent corporation, directors have an
obligation to ensure that the corporation is properly administered
and its assets are not dissipated in a manner that is prejudicial to
62
its creditors. Justice Greenberg adopted Professor Ziegel's view

58

Ibid. at para. 42.
Ibid. at para. 48.
60
Ibid.
61
People's Department Stores Inc. v. Wise (1998), 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200 (Qc. S.C.)
[Peoples 1998]; Canbook Distribution Corporation v. Borrins, [2000] 45 O.R.
(3d) 565 (S.C.J.).
62
Peoples 1998, supra note 61. A number of Canadian academics commented on
this decision. See D. Thomson, “Directors, Creditors and Insolvency: A
Fiduciary Duty or a Duty not to Oppress?”; Janis P. Sarra & Ronald B. Davis,
Director and Officer Liability in Corporate Insolvency (Markham, ON:
59
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on extending fiduciary duties to creditors, holding that “It is not
[unreasonable], in exchange for the benefit of limited liability, to
impose a duty on directors not to sacrifice creditors’ interests
when the going gets rough … . If the company is insolvent … only
63
the creditors still have a meaningful stake in its assets.” The
Supreme Court rejected this line of reasoning and held that the
general nature of the statutory fiduciary duty does not change
when the corporation approaches insolvency or finds itself in
bankruptcy. In doing so, the Court upheld directors legally
mandated mediating hierarch role in the bankruptcy and
reorganization context.
The only application of Peoples by an appellant court at the time
of writing also supports a Team Production Theory explanation of
the judicial application of the statutory fiduciary duty in Canadian
corporate law. In Re Stelco Inc.,64 as part of Stelco’s reorganization
under the Companies Creditors Arrangements Act,65 Justice Farley
applied the reasoning in Peoples to void the appointment of two
Stelco directors, Roland Keiper and Michael Woollcombe,
66
In reaching his decision,
pursuant to s. 111(1) of the CBCA.

Butterworths, 2002) at 15-21; C. Graham W. King, “Extending Fiduciary
Principles to the Director-Creditor Relationship: A Canadian Perspective”
(2002) 29 Man. L.J. 243; Edward M. Iaccobucci, “A Wise Decision? An Analysis
of the Relationship between Corporate Ownership Structure and Directors’ and
Officers’ Duties” (2002) 36 C.B.L.J. 227; Christopher C. Nicholls, “Liability of
Corporate Officers and Directors to Third Parties” (2001) 35 C.B.L.J. 1 at 30-37;
and A. Keay, “The Directors’ Duty to Take into Account the Interest of
Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?” (2001) 25 Mel. U.L. Rev. 315.
63
Peoples 1998, supra note 61 at para. 190, citing Jacob S. Ziegel, “Creditors as
Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution--An Anglo-Canadian
Perspective” (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 511 at 511-12.
64
2005 CarswellOnt 743 [Stelco].
65
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
66
Section 111(1) of the CBCA provides that: Despite subsection 114(3), but
subject to subsections (3) and (4), a quorum of directors may fill a vacancy
among the directors, except a vacancy resulting from an increase in the number
or the minimum or maximum number of directors or a failure to elect the
number or minimum number of directors provided for in the articles.
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Justice Farley characterized Stelco’s goal as its successful
emergence from CCAA proceedings, as a long-term viable and
competitive participant in the domestic and international steel
industry, with the maximum benefit for the stakeholders on a
67
collective basis through the facility of a “better corporation.”
The employee stakeholders of Stelco had brought a motion arguing
that, because Mr. Keiper and Mr. Woollcombe were shareholder
representatives, as board members they would favour maximizing
shareholder value at the expense of the interests of the employees.
Mr. Keiper is the President of Clearwater Capital Management
Inc., a Toronto-based investment manager. Prior to co-founding
Clearwater in 1999, Mr. Keiper headed the Canadian proprietary
investing activities of RBC Dominion Securities. Mr. Woollcombe
is a principal of VC & Co. Incorporated, which acts as a strategic
advisor to institutional and other shareholders with respect to
their investments in Canadian public and private companies.
Justice Farley agreed with the employee stakeholders and after 2
days of serving on the board held that Mr. Keiper and Mr.
Woollcombe were not in a position to serve as neutral
intermediaries as corporate law requires of board members of a
public corporation. Justice Farley found that Mr. Keiper and Mr.
Woollcombe were “spokespersons for the shareholders”68 and had
as their goals short term maximization of shareholder value.
Justice Farley did not feel that the two directors were neutral or
that they would “do the right thing in using their business
judgment, not the thing which they know or even suspect that any
outsider (individual or supposedly important and possibly
powerful stakeholder or partial group thereof) may wish to have
happen for that outsider's benefit, not the benefit of the new better
69
corporation.”

67

Stelco, supra note 64 at para. 1.
Ibid. at para. 20.
69
Ibid. at para. 4.
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Justice Farley’s decision represents a departure from a Team
Production Theory of Canadian corporate law. It runs counter to
Canadian courts’ historical reluctance to interfere with directors’
independence. Justice Farley cites the reasoning in Peoples to
enable one group of stakeholders, employees, to obviate the
independence of the Stelco directors on the basis of a perception
that two directors would perform their role with a view to short
term shareholder value maximization rather than the best
interests of the corporation. Justice Farley’s decision challenges
Canadian corporate law’s understanding of the director as a
mediating hierarch based on the reality that directors of public
companies in Canada generally have interests that align with a
particular group of shareholders or other powerful stakeholders.
On appeal, Justice Blair rejected Justice Farley’s attempt to depart
from a Team Production Theory understanding of the legal role of
directors to consider who was actually playing this role.70 Justice
Blair used the reasoning in Peoples to uphold the independent
legal role of directors and Canadian courts’ reluctance to interfere
with that role and propel into the shoes of the board absent clear
evidence that the directors were pursuing their interests ahead of
71
the corporation’s interests. Justice Blair accepted as a reality that
there are connections between Canadian corporate directors and
various stakeholders, but held that this in itself was not sufficient
to justify a finding of a breach of fiduciary duty and an imposition
of a corrective sanction.72 Accordingly, Justice Blair reinstated Mr.
Keiper and Mr. Woollcombe.
DUTY OF CARE
In addition to the statutory fiduciary duty, Canadian directors
have a legal obligation to “exercise the care, diligence and skill
that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable

70

Stelco Inc., Re, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188 at para. 70.
Ibid. at para. 60.
72
Ibid. at para. 76.
71
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circumstances.”73 On its face, the statutory duty of care appears to
be broader than the statutory fiduciary duty. Unlike the statutory
fiduciary duty, which stipulates the identity of the beneficiary of
that duty as the corporation, the duty of care leaves the beneficiary
of the duty open. Accordingly, in Peoples, the Court held that
such a duty could be owed to creditors. However, in practice, the
application of the statutory duty of care has been extremely
limited by the business judgment rule.74 In applying the business
judgment rule to the inventory procurement policy that the Wise
brothers had adopted and holding that the Wise brothers had not
breached their duty of care, the Supreme Court described the
Canadian business judgment rule as in line with its
commonwealth counterparts:
Canadian courts, like their counterparts in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect
to the enforcement of the duty of care that respects the
fact that directors and officers often have business
expertise that courts do not. Many decisions made in
the
course
of
business,
although
ultimately
unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time
they are made. Business decisions must sometimes be
made, with high stakes and under considerable time
pressure, in circumstances in which detailed
information is not available. It might be tempting for
some to see unsuccessful business decisions as
unreasonable or imprudent in light of information that
becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of

73

CBCA, supra note 27, s. 122(1)(b).
For an alternative view concerning the role of the business judgment rule
following Peoples see Rousseau, supra note 2. Rousseau references the Supreme
Court’s reliance on article 1457 of the Quebec Civil Code (Q.C.C.) and argues
on this basis that the conception of the duty of care in Peoples may lead to a
greater role for the judiciary in corporate governance and greater liability risk for
directors.
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hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of
deference to business decisions called the “business
judgment rule”, adopting the American name for the
75
rule.
The use of the business judgment rule to limit the application of
the duty of care runs counter to the shareholder primacy model as
it insulates directors from claims by corporate stakeholders,
including shareholders. The limiting of breach of duty of care
actions to those instances where the corporation’s interests as a
whole have not been served, supports the mediating hierarch
model as it prevents corporate stakeholders from using lawsuits to
extract rents from the corporation. Consistent with the theory
articulated by Blair and Stout, the limiting role of the business
judgment rule in the Canadian context allows directors to sacrifice
shareholders’ interests to those of other corporate stakeholders,
since it “‘ties the hands’ of shareholders of public corporations in a
fashion that ultimately serves their interests as a class, as well as
those of other members of the corporate coalition.”76

THE LIMITS ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING
The third proposition that Blair and Stout put forward to support
the idea that the director primacy norm is at work in American
corporate law is based on the limits of shareholder voting. The
practical and legal obstacles in American corporate law ensure
that shareholders cannot use such voting rights to exercise
authority over the board of directors. Accordingly, directors can
perform their mediating hierarch role free from direct control of
shareholders or any other stakeholder of the public corporation.
The legal and practical obstacles to shareholder action in the

75
76
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TPT, supra note 12 at 305.

2006]

A TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY

27

Canadian context have been observed by a number of
commentators who have argued for greater shareholder voice.77
Before outlining the obstacles to shareholder action in the
Canadian context, it is important to address the American critique
of Blair and Stout’s focus on shareholder voting rights. Blair and
Stout have been criticized for focusing on shareholder voting
rights because they overlook the market for corporate control,
which turns “the limited de jure shareholder voice into a powerful
de facto form of shareholder control.”78 While observations
concerning market based accountability measures are important in
evaluating the relative importance of law, they are beyond the
scope of the current project of considering the salience of Blair and
Stout’s description of the legal role of directors of Canadian
corporations. As part of this evaluation a range of market forces
that may cause directors to be accountable to shareholders are not
considered – including for example, capital and reputational
markets. Where Canadian corporate law does address these forces
in the context of the market for control, the earlier discussion on
the statutory fiduciary duty indicates that directors’ mediating
hierarch role is upheld.
Shareholders of Canadian public corporations have the right to
vote to elect or remove directors and also on certain
“fundamental” corporate changes.79 However, the right to vote
has significant free rider, collective action, and rational apathy

77

For example, Janis Sarra, “The Corporation as a Symphony: Are Shareholders
First Violin or Second Fiddle?” (2003) 36 U.B.C.L. Rev. 403. See also Janis Sarra,
“Convergence Versus Divergence, Global Corporate Governance at the
Crossroads: Governance Norms, Capital Markets & OECD Principles for
Corporate Governance” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 177; Edward M.
Iacobucci, “The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation” (1998) 48
U.T.L.J. 489; and Anita Indira Anand, “Shareholder Isolation and the Regulation
of Auditors” (2004) 54 U.T.L.J. 1.
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John C. Coates IV, “Measuring the Domain of the Mediating Hierarchy: How
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problems associated with it. With respect to electing the board,
management will generally set the date for elections, nominate
candidates, and use corporate funds to solicit proxy votes from
shareholders.
While shareholders who disagree with
management’s proposals for a board may obtain a list of
shareholders, the shares they hold, and their addresses from the
corporation, so as to contact other shareholders for the purpose of
influencing their voting, such action is rare.80 This is in part
because, if a shareholder does solicit proxies, other than through a
“public broadcast,” from more than sixteen shareholders,81 they
must engage in the costly process of sending out a dissident’s
82
proxy circular.
Similarly, shareholders right to vote on “fundamental” changes is
also limited in reality. The types of changes that are defined as
fundamental are narrow. They include amendment of articles;83
amendment, repeal, or the introduction of new by-laws;84
amalgamation;85 and sale of substantially all the corporation’s
assets.86
In each case, without a shareholder proposal, all
shareholders can do is agree or disagree with the question put to
them by the directors.
The exception to the general rule that the board sets the agenda for
shareholder meetings, and that the right to vote on fundamental
changes is nothing more than a veto power, is the statutory
provision for shareholder proposals. Shareholders, who have a
right to vote, have held shares for at least six months, and hold
either 1 per cent of the total outstanding voting shares of the
corporation or shares with a fair market value of $2000, may make

80
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a shareholder proposal for any matter they wish to discuss,
87
The
including amendments to the corporation’s articles.
proposal may include nominations for the election of directors
only if holders of not less than 5 per cent of the shares entitled to
vote sign the proposal. If the corporation is required to distribute a
management proxy circular, the shareholder proposal must be
included along with a statement by the shareholder; however, the
total word count cannot exceed 500 words.88 The shareholders’
right of initiative with respect to directorial nominations, which
does not exist in the American context, is a noteworthy difference
in Canadian corporate law. However, this difference does not
make it more difficult to argue that Canadian corporate law
constitutes directors as independent mediating hierarchs. The
shareholder proposal mechanism is not consistently used in
Canada. For example, a record number of approximately eighty
shareholder proposals were reported in September 2005 for the
period between January and September 2005.89 Out of these
proposals, only 3 concerned directorial nominations.90

PART IV: TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY AND THE
CANADIAN OPPRESSION REMEDY
Part III illustrated how the features of American corporate law that
evidence the director primacy norm and support a Team
Production Theory of American corporate law can also be located
in Canadian corporate law. These features of Canadian corporate
law free directors of widely-held public Canadian corporations to
balance the competing interests of the various corporate
stakeholders who make up the corporation. However, in order to
fully consider whether Canadian corporate law supports a Team

87

Ibid., s. 137(1.1), Regulations, s. 46.
Ibid., s.150.
89
Shareholder Proposals (2005), online at
http://www.share.ca/index.cfm/fuseaction/page.inside/pageID/751215E5-B0D0157F-F405B9A1ABA8AE7B/index.cfm.
90
Ibid.
88

30

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 01

Production Theory, a potential departing point for the Canadian
experience, the oppression remedy, which is not found in
91
American corporate law, needs to be examined.
The Canadian oppression remedy has been described as the
broadest of the Canadian corporate law remedies.92 The oppression
remedy is available to the same broad range of complainants as the
derivative action on proof of an act or omission, in respect of a
corporation or its affiliates, that is “oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any
security holder, creditor, director or officer.”93 The oppression
remedy is not only intended to protect strict legal rights, but also
94
The approach
to protect the expectations of the complainant.
that has most commonly been taken by Canadian courts in
interpreting the oppression remedy has been a general fairness

91

In some American states a statutory shareholder oppression remedy exists
that is similar to Section 14.30(2)(ii) of the Model Business Corporation Act,
which provides for judicial dissolution upon application by a stockholder if "the
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as compared to the Canadian oppression remedy. See Douglass K. Moll,
“Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of
Perspective (2000), 53 Vand. L. Rev. 749 and Paula Dalley, “The Misguided
Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties” (2004) 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 175.
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820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold Ballard Ltd. (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) at 179. For a discussion of the origins of the oppression remedy see First
Edmonton Place Ltd. v. 315888 Alberta Ltd. (1998), 60 ALR (2d) 122 (QB).
93
CBCA, supra note 27, s. 241(2).
94
See for example, Westfair Foods Ltd. v. Watt (1991), 115 A.R. 34, 79 D.L.R.
(4th) 48 (Alta. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused 85 D.L.R. (4th) viii, recently
referred to in Clarke v. Rossburger (2001), 18 B.L.R. (3d) 197, 108 A.C.W.S. 74
(C.A.).
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standard based on the reasonable expectations of the applicant,
95
rather than three different standards. On a finding of oppression,
the court has the discretion to choose from fourteen prescribed
forms of relief or to make “the order it thinks fit.”96
A review of the judicial treatment of the oppression remedy
illustrates that it has great potential to deal with extra-legal
sources of power that can be used to dictate unfair distributional
outcomes that are consistent with strict legal rights of the parties
involved, but that do not reflect the parties’ reasonable
expectations.
However, in the current context, the broad
characterization of the remedy is most accurate with respect to its
availability to minority, and some instances majority
shareholders, or other stakeholders of closely-held corporations.
The only comprehensive empirical study of the judicial treatment
of the oppression remedy in Canada detailed that of the reported
oppression remedy decisions between 1995-2001 only 9 per cent or
six cases involved widely-held public corporations, with the
remaining 92 per cent of oppression actions litigated in the
context of closely-held corporations.97 Of the six cases involving
widely-held corporations, only two, or 33 per cent, were
successful, compared to a success rate of 54 per cent for closelyheld corporations.98
In the context of closely-held corporations, the oppression remedy
has been used to overcome specific legal rights in cases where the
corporation has oppressed the interests and reasonable
expectations of the stakeholders seeking relief.
Within the
context of closely-held corporations, the oppression remedy has
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For a discussion of the standard see Jeffrey MacIntosh, “Bad Faith and the
Oppression Remedy: Uneasy Marriage or Amicable Divorce?” (1990) 69 Can.
Bar Rev. 276.
96
CBCA, supra note 27, s. 241(3).
97
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy
Judicially Considered: 1995-2001” (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 79 at para. 27.
98
Ibid.
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not been specifically confined for the benefit of minority
shareholders. The oppression remedy was granted to non-minority
shareholders of closely-held corporations in 14 per cent of the 80
per cent of cases where the complainants were shareholders of
99
For example, in Gandalman
closely-held corporations.
Investments100 and M. v. H.,101 both plaintiffs were 50 per cent
shareholders. In both cases, the courts expressed the view that
determining whether the behavior was oppressive required
considering the balance of power, which existed between the
shareholders, not solely considering the absolute shareholdings.102
Canadian courts have also extended the availability of the
oppression remedy to a trustee in bankruptcy of a closely-held
corporation103 and granted the remedy to creditors of closely-held
corporations in a number of instances.104
If the oppression remedy was applied to widely-held public
corporations by Canadian courts in the same fashion it has been

99

Ibid. at para. 50.
Re Gandalman Investments Inc. et al. and Fogle et al. (1985), 52 O.R. (2d)
614 [Gandalman Investments]. In Gandalman Investments, one of the 50 per
cent shareholders acted as the secretary-treasurer and carried on the business of
the company, while the other unsuccessfully attempted to be appointed a
director and sought a remedy under s. 247 of the Business Corporations Act,
1982 (Ont.), c. 4. A preliminary objection was raised on the ground that the
oppression remedy was only available to minority shareholders. The court held
that a “complainant” could include “any security holder,” and as such, is not
limited to only minority shareholders.
101
[1993] O.J. No. 2492. [M v.H] The plaintiff in this case was a 50 per cent
shareholder in two businesses with a partner, but was being excluded from
business operations due to the dissolution of a romantic relationship. The
plaintiff sought relief pursuant to s. 248 of the CBCA, and succeeded on the
basis that the defendant had excluded the plaintiff from at least one of the
businesses and ignored her expectations.
102
Gandalman Investment at para. 7; M. v. H. at 640.
103
Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty
Corp. (2001), 28 CBR (4th) 294 (Ont. SCJ).
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See Sidaplex-Plastics Suppliers Inc. v. Elta Group Inc. (1998), 162 DLR (4th)
367 (Ont. C.A.) and Downtown Eatery (1983) Ltd. v. Ontario (2001), 200 DLR
(4th) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
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increasingly applied to closely-held corporations, its existence in
Canadian corporate law could cut against a Team Production
Theory of Canadian corporate law of widely-held public
corporations. That is, the central premise of Team Production
Theory is that corporate law is designed to free directors from
domination by any stakeholder, which allows them to act as
mediating hierarchs. However, if the oppression remedy was
widely available and consistently used by stakeholders of widelyheld public corporations, then a space for directorial discretion
may not exist or be necessary. Corporate law could mandate
directors to act on behalf of shareholders, but subject to fair
treatment of other stakeholders as protected by the oppression
remedy.
Peoples leaves open the possibility for the broad use of the
oppression remedy by stakeholders of public corporations as it
endorses the of-cited description of the oppression remedy as “the
broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder
remedy in the common law world.” Further, the Court held that
“the availability of such a broad oppression remedy undermines
any perceived need to extend the fiduciary duty imposed on
directors by paragraph 122(1)(a) of the CBCA to include
creditors.”105 This reasoning suggests that in future cases the
oppression remedy analysis will not require a determination of
whether directors have breached their fiduciary duties and that it
may be possible to use the oppression remedy to hold directors
accountable to individual stakeholders. However, neither position
is new, and both can be taken as obiter as the case itself did not
106
Importantly, practical obstacles
concern an oppression action.
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Peoples, supra note 1 at 48 and 51.
Rather, the case was based on the issue of whether directors owe a duty to
creditors. The trustee, representing the interests of the creditors, sued the
directors for an alleged breach of the duties imposed by s. 122(1) of the CBCA. In
its analysis, the Court recognized that, according to article 300 of the Q.C.C.
and s. 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, the civil law serves as a
supplementary source of law to federal legislation. The CBCA does not entitle
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also stand in the way of the oppression remedy developing in a
way that displaces directors existing legal role in Canadian public
corporations as mediating hierarchs.
The direction in Peoples that the judicial application of the
oppression remedy is to be divorced from a fiduciary duty analysis
has been given by lower courts in the past without significant
impact on how the judiciary has engaged in their analysis of
oppression actions.107 As a practical matter, judges draw on their
overall knowledge of corporate law in dealing with the relatively
few oppression actions that they are faced with each year.108 As a
result, the judicial treatment of the oppression remedy has
frequently drawn from the case law on breach of statutory duties
and imported the analysis of concepts such as the “best interests
of the corporation” and the “business judgment rule” from this
case law.
For example, in 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd.,109
Justice Farley granted the oppression remedy to a minority

creditors to sue directors directly for breach of their duties, and so the Court
deemed it appropriate to have recourse to the Q.C.C. to establish how rights
grounded in a federal statute should be considered in Quebec. The Court also
looked to the Q.C.C. to determine how s. 122(1) of the CBCA can be
harmonized with the principles of civil liability. See ibid. at para. 29-30.
107
See for example Brant Investments Ltd.. et al. v. KeepRite Inc. et al. (1991),
45 O.A.C. 320; 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) affing. (1987), 60 O.R.(2d) 737 (H.C.), where
the Court of Appeal held at 301:
It must be recalled that in dealing with s. 234, the impugned acts, the results of
the impugned acts, the protected groups, and the powers of the court to grant
remedies are all extremely broad. To import the concept of breach of fiduciary
duty into that statutory provision would not only complicate its interpretation
and application, but could be inimical to the statutory fiduciary duty imposed
upon directors in s. 117(1) (now s. 122(1)) of the CBCA).
108
See for example, Ben-Ishai & Puri, supra note 97 at para. 21, where the
authors noted there were 71 cases that dealt with the oppression remedy on its
merits between January 1995 and November 2001.
109
(1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 171, affirmed (1991), 3 B.L.R. (2d)
113 (Div. Ct.) [Ballard].
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shareholder of a closely-held corporation. Justice Farely referenced
the Supreme Court’s definition of a corporation in Ringuet v.
110
Bergeron, and held that:
“while it would be appropriate for a director to consider
the individual desires of one or more various
shareholders … it would be inappropriate for that
director to only consider the interests of certain
shareholders and to either ignore the others or worse
still act in a way detrimental to their interests. The safe
way to avoid this problem is to have directors act in the
best interests of the corporation.”111
The Ballard decision has been frequently cited and followed by
Canadian courts applying the oppression remedy112 and was
referred to in the Peoples discussion of the fiduciary duty,113
reflecting how difficult it is for the judiciary to divorce their
understanding of the Canadian fiduciary duty from their analysis
and application of the oppression remedy.
In addition, while Canadian courts have recognized that the
oppression remedy is a broad and flexible tool designed to protect
the interests of corporate stakeholders in a variety of ways, they
have also been influenced by the business judgment rule and its
application to the statutory duty of care. For example, in Re
Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp.,114 the Court of Appeal for
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[1960] S.C.R. 672, 24 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
Ballard, supra note 109 at para. 105.
112
See for example, Riverstar Inc. v. Hookenson, [2004] A.J. No. 1500 (Q.B.);
McAteer v. Devoncroft Developments Ltd., [2001] A.J. No. 1481 (Q.B.); Deluce
Holdings Inc v. Air Canada, [1992] O.J. No. 2382 (Gen. Div.).
113
Peoples, supra note 1 at para. 41.
114
(1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (C.A.) at 137. This was an appeal after the application
for relief was dismissed under s.234 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.
S.C. 1974-5, c. 33. The appellant claimed that the corporation and the directors
had, by organizing a special meeting to vote on a resolution to amend its articles
to reorganize its capital, acted in a manner that was oppressive, unfairly
111
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Ontario held that it was imperative that the oppression remedy
was applied in a manner that balances the protection of
stakeholders and the ability of management to conduct business in
an efficient manner. More recently, in Catalyst Fund General
115
Partner Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., when Justice Campbell invoked
the oppression remedy to remove the directors of Hollinger, he
held that this was an extreme form of judicial intervention that
should be a measure of last resort where directors were “motivated
116
by putting their interests first, not those of the company.”
A further limitation on the oppression remedy disturbing other
aspects of Canadian corporate law that shield directors from
domination by individual stakeholders, is that similar to any form
of litigation, a significant impediment to recourse through the
oppression remedy is the financial resources of the litigants.
Recent Canadian case law has held that a class proceeding founded
upon an oppression action under the CBCA can be maintained.117
However, the possibility for oppression remedy class proceedings

prejudicial, or unfairly disregarded her interests as a security holder. On appeal,
Brooke J.A. found for the appellant and granted her relief for oppression.
115
2004 CarswellOnt 4772 (S.C.J.). This was an application by Catalyst against
Hollinger Inc., where it sought the removal of a majority of the company's board
of directors pursuant to the power granted under the oppression remedy. The
allegations against those directors concerned the fact that $1.1 million loan
made by Hollinger Inc. to its parent Ravelston had not been authorized by the
Board of Hollinger Inc. at the time it was made in June 2004. Further, the
existence of the loan had not been disclosed during Catalyst’s first application
heard earlier by the court.
116
Ibid. at para. 83.
117
Stern v. Imasco, [1999] 1 B.L.R. (3d) 198 at para. 78 [Stern]. In Stern, Daniel
Stern initiated an action, on behalf of himself and as representative of a class
that included all shareholders (other than the defendants), claiming that a
proposed transaction was oppressive and that it constituted a breach of fiduciary
duties owed by the individual defendant directors to Imasco's shareholders.
Although the Court dismissed the motion, Justice Cumming found that Stern’s
claim for oppression was a complaint only against the corporation rather than
the directors, and that an oppression action could form a basis for a class
proceeding, despite the fact that there are many elements of a class proceeding
that are not found in an action for oppression.
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is limited by the requirement that all members of the class must
118
demonstrate that they have common reasonable expectations.

PART IV: CONCLUSION
This article has used the recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision, Peoples, which has attracted a great deal of interest
among academic and lawyer commentators, to challenge the
underlying assumption that Canadian corporate governance
debates are currently operating on. That is, Canadian corporate
law of public corporations currently reflects a principle-agent,
shareholder primacy model and Peoples represents a departure
from this model. This article has challenged this understanding of
Canadian corporate law by illustrating how key features of
Canadian corporate law, including Peoples, are consistent with a
director primacy norm and the Team Production Theory of
corporate law developed in the American context.
By illustrating that the current state of Canadian corporate law
frees directors of widely–held public companies to balance the
competing interests and maintain the confidence of the various
stakeholders of such corporations, this article has provided the
descriptive context for beginning to ask a range of normative
questions. In particular, is the legal role of directors of Canadian
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Shaw v. BCE Inc., [2003] O.J. NO. 2695 (QL) (S.C.J.) [Shaw]. In Shaw, BCE
filed a motion that the Statement of Claim be struck out and dismissed against
BCE on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action against BCE.
In the Statement of Claim, Shaw pled two causes of action: negligent
misrepresentation and oppression. Justice Farley found that Shaw did not make
out a reasonable cause of action for oppression, further stating that Shaw was
not an appropriate representative plaintiff since his personal “wish list” of
expectations were not reasonable and were not shared by all of the shareholders.
It should be noted that Shaw amended the Statement of Claim, and BCE again
filed a motion to strike on the same grounds. In Shaw v. BCE Inc., [2003] O.J.
No. 5481 (QL) (S.C.J.), affirmed [2004] O.J. No. 3109 (QL) (C.A.), Justice Farley
again struck the amended Statement of Claim as failing to disclose a reasonable
cause of action in oppression.
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corporations consistent with the role that they actually play? In
addition, is it possible and/or desirable for directors of Canadian
corporations to play this role given the current composition of
corporate boards? Further empirical work needs to be done to
consider the first question and the issue of the relative importance
of law in this context.
The second question concerns a central fairness issue that arises
from a Team Production Theory of Canadian corporate law. That
is, while directors are constituted as independent mediating
hierarchs in law, they are overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of
powerful corporate stakeholders, including shareholders and
creditors. Blair and Stout suggest that like the judiciary or the
police, it is possible for directors to play an independent role, even
if they are drawn from a certain group of stakeholders.119 As
recognized by Justice Farley in Re Stelco, the role of the corporate
director as currently conceived in practice is quite different than
that of a professional acting in the public interest. As currently
constituted, a directorship is a business role. Directors will have a
range of extra-legal incentives to favor powerful stakeholder
interests over those of more politically vulnerable stakeholders,
such as employees, in a range of situations. For example, Millon
has argued that in a widely-held public corporation, shareholders
will always have a lower cost exist option than employees who
have already made team specific investments in nontransferable
knowledge and skills.120 These unequal power relations within
public corporations translate into employees extracting minimal
surpluses, despite increased productivity demonstrated by indexes,
such as the Dow Jones Industrial Index, increasing rapidly in
value.121 On this basis, Millon argues that shareholders will always
122
win the rent allocation contest.

119

TPT, supra note 12 at 253.
Millon, supra note 26, at 1042.
121
Ibid. at 1029.
122
Ibid.
120

2006]

A TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY

39

In considering whether the independent hierarch legal role for
directors is the most desirable model, a question that will need to
be considered in the Canadian context is if and how this role can
be given meaning in practice. One possibility is to create a class of
professional
independent
mediating
hierarchs
or
to
“professionalize” directors through education. Director education
has already been recognized as a mechanism for dealing with the
increasingly complex nature of the Canadian business climate as
well as the dynamic role that directors are expected to play in this
climate.123
Both commentators and members of the legal
community have acknowledged a link between board competence
and corporate success.124 Even directors themselves have realized
that limitations on their ability to participate in meaningful and
strategic discussions are due to gaps in their knowledge and
understanding about both the role of the board, as well as the
125
corporation for which they serve.
At the same time, there are number of challenges that will need to
be addressed in adopting this approach. Successful educational
programs may be restricted by the limited term of directorships,
typically to a maximum of three years.126 To address this concern,
any director training must be concise and time-sensitive, and also
broad enough in scope to allow transferability between boards.
Director education might also contribute to complacency about
board effectiveness by giving a false sense of security about the
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competence of individual directors.127 As well, if director training
becomes a prerequisite, this could stifle board diversification by
128
and thereby limit board
limiting qualified candidates,
effectiveness based on the rationale that the more diverse the
board is, the more capable it will be to play an independent
mediating hierarch role.129 Finally, the risk of high costs associated
with director education could further limit access to such
education and reduce diversity of corporate boards.
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